Last week, I wrote a piece on the reasons to intervene in Syria. I did what critics of an intervention asked, and provided two goals for U.S. action and a way forward. Since then, I have changed my mind: the time has passed, and the window for an effective intervention in Syria has closed. Even if the President were not about to lose a vote in Congress — which, it seems, is now likely — it’s time to let it go, at least for now.
This is a good place to remind you all that I write and speak in my own capacity as a scholar and policy expert, and not as a representative of any of the institutions with which I am associated.
The bitter-enders like William Kristol are arguing that we have no choice, and particularly that House Republicans should resist the urge to deliver a mortal blow to the President over Syria:
The fact is that Obama is the only president we have. We can’t abdicate our position in the world for the next three years. So Republicans will have to resist the temptation to weaken him when the cost is weakening the country. A party that for at least two generations has held high the banner of American leadership and strength should not cast a vote that obviously risks a damaging erosion of this country’s stature and credibility abroad.
I think that’s both alarmist and inaccurate. It’s true that the President will suffer a political defeat if this vote fails, but I’d argue that this whole circus has gone on for so long at this point that the damage is already done, to the President and to the country, even if the vote — somehow — comes out in his favor.
This debate, both in the country at large and in Washington, just went on too long, became too partisan, too hysterical, and too drenched in sanctimony and ignorance. Even if we do the right thing, it will be for all the wrong reasons.
Meanwhile, while we’ve dithered and argued, the Syrian regime has recovered its footing. The Brits are out, the Russians are up, the UN is down. The Syrians have used gas, and they have now learned that at best, the democracies will react to such things by tying themselves up in knots and engaging in horribly self-referential navel-gazing, dilatory hearings, and earnest hand-wringing. A stumble into Syria isn’t going to sober us up.
Letting this one go doesn’t mean giving up on everything forever. We’ve recovered from far worse than this: we went from a loss in Vietnam to putting the Soviet Union on the road to oblivion in the space of a decade. This kind of ghastly fumble is recoverable, but not right away. We need to start a far greater reconstruction of our foreign policy, and we can’t do that while we’re doubled over from punching each other in the groin over Syria.
Note that I have not changed my mind about the moral justice of intervention against the regime of Bashar Assad. Nor am I any more or less worried about the many horrible alternatives conjured up by opponents of military action. Rather — and here I am speaking to my fellow liberal interventionists — it is time to let this go because the combined actions of a critical mass of people in the elected branches of the U.S. government, the defense intellectual community, and especially in the media have created a situation in which any action now risks becoming a complete disaster both in Syria and at home.
We had a chance to do something right and good, and through our own self-indulgence, laziness, petulance, ignorance, and incompetence, we’ve blown it. There’s plenty of blame to go around. Partisans of each party will blame the President or the Congress, depending on their alliances; others will point the finger abroad at British Prime Minister David Cameron, Iran, the United Nations, Vladimir Putin — well, we should lay some blame on Putin, to be sure — and any number of other actors for the continuation of the Syrian slaughter.
But in the end, we have only ourselves, the American people, to blame. We’ve spoken loud and clear, and we’ve said in a steady voice: “We no longer have any idea what the hell we’re doing or what we stand for.”
And our elected officials have listened. In the President’s case, his initial and correct gut instinct to go after the Syrian regime for using chemical weapons was blunted by the popular argument that he needed (unlike other Presidents) to go to Congress, producing a fateful delay.
Congress in turn asked its constituents what they wanted. Faced with a hypothetical intervention — and people hate those hypotheticals — in a place they don’t know much about, they opted for doing nothing so that they could get back to arguing over the proper use of the word “twerking.”
Of course, in the end, many of the people opposed to intervention blame George Bush and the Iraq war for their reticence. That seems plausible the first time you hear it, and then you start to wonder: do President Obama’s supporters really think he’s as untrustworthy as they think President Bush was? Do Republicans who supported Bush in 2003 really want to make the argument they were hoodwinked and are now gun-shy?
Here’s a spoiler to those questions: I think the “it’s because of Bush” arguments are just plain bullshit all around. This isn’t 2003; Obama isn’t Bush; the existence and use of WMD in this case are not notional but real; and no one’s talking about an invasion. Conjuring up a debate from last decade is just another way of running for political cover on a tough call. Enough already.
To be sure, this time around in a Middle East conflict, Americans weren’t offered much in the way of explanations or leadership. I am still mystified, as are many people, by the President’s sudden turns over the past month. Secretary of State John Kerry, in one of the best speeches of his life, made a clear case for action, but the President made an 11th-hour change that left his national security team (according to reports, anyway) as puzzled as everyone else.
On the other hand (and in fairness to the administration), you shouldn’t need a whole lot of explanation about why chemical attacks on civilians should be stopped. This should have been as close as there is to a no-brainer (if not a “slam dunk,” a term we may never use again) by the standards of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy.
I believe if the President had made the case quickly and forcefully, our initial strikes would already be over. At the G-20, the President could now be explaining to Putin that if he doesn’t like what we did, Russia should have helped get Assad under control a lot earlier than this.
But that’s not how it went.
Meanwhile, our military leaders are…well, it’s not clear what they’re doing. Apparently, a lot of them are talking to journalists and retired generals, complaining behind the scenes about a war they don’t want to fight. The ultimate triumph of this insider campaign was an appalling piece by retired Army Major General Robert Scales in the Washington Post this week, in which Scales sought to disrupt the delicate, crucial balance of civil-military relations by letting us all know just how much our valiant warriors want nothing to do with what they obviously see as a bunch of confused chicken hawks and hippies in the White House:
Our senior soldiers…are tired of wannabe soldiers who remain enamored of the lure of bloodless machine warfare….Our military members understand and take seriously their oath to defend the constitutional authority of their civilian masters. They understand that the United States is the only liberal democracy that has never been ruled by its military. But today’s soldiers know war and resent civilian policymakers who want the military to fight a war that neither they nor their loved ones will experience firsthand.
You can almost hear Scales throwing a beer can at the television while telling Meathead and Gloria to shut their pie-holes. (And since when is America the only liberal democracy that’s never been ruled by the military? Was there a coup in Canada that I missed?)
Scales, like the rest of us, is a private citizen and can say anything he likes, but his hit piece on civilian policymakers is one of many that contained the “every military officer I talked to thinks…” line in it. That’s a dangerous thing in a democracy: as a civilian who once advised a senior member of Congress, I am not interested in which wars the military wants to fight. I didn’t realize it worked that way. (I also had no idea that retired generals were able to speak on behalf of anonymous members of the senior command in the pages of one of America’s newspapers of record.)
Anyway, the only thing worse than a bad policy is the refusal ever to give up on that bad policy, and I’m giving up on this one. After the 2003 Gulf War, U.S. Ambassador Barbara Bodine said that there were only four or five ways to have done the Iraq war right, and 500 ways to do it wrong. What she didn’t count on, she later admitted, was that we were going to try all 500 ways first.
That’s what I think is about to happen with Syria. Intervention is the right thing to do. But not if we try all 500 stupid ways first.
Syria has also been the perfect venue, like a singles bar at 2 am, for the moonbat left and the wingnut right to find each other out of desperation. (Among the many low points: Fox’s Eric Bolling covering his hand in ketchup on national television. Seriously.) And no one can flood the zone with bad information and conspiracy theories like extremists, and that does have a solid impact on an American population whose political literacy is already abysmally low.
The more disturbing trend, however, has been the way in which partisans of both parties have been mortgaging their principles in the name of party loyalty. Republicans who cheered on a full-up invasion of Iraq now thoughtfully pull on their chins and call for cooler heads to prevail while they pretend to reflect on strategic theory. Democrats, for their part, have rediscovered the joys of intervention. (Howard Dean supports a strike on Syria. Howard Dean?)
Let’s just say it out loud: we, collectively, have allowed our foreign policy to drown in a partisan swamp. The President tried to outflank Congress by handing them the power they say they want but in reality that they never want. Republicans have held up action because they loathe President Obama and do not want him to get credit for any kind of successful military action, no matter how right the cause. Democrats, meanwhile, are signing on to military strikes that they would normally oppose with screams so loud the veins in their heads would pop, all because this time it’s their guy who thought of doing it.
There are exceptions on both sides: Vietnam veterans John McCain and John Kerry are the obvious choices. But overall, there has been a partisan division in our leadership, one that reflects the sour, churlish, partisan mood of the American people.
And in a democracy, the people have the right to be wrong. Further down the road, we’ll have to pay the price for the American public’s ill-informed hissy fits on everything from the NSA to Syria, but those days aren’t here yet. While I still believe that the President could have turned public opinion around, especially if he had acted rather than displaying his own doubts, the fact of the matter is that the American public has decided that the use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians is something they can live with.
So be it. We’ll have to fight this out again when the next outrage takes place. And because of what we’ve done — what we have all done — this time around, there will be another outrage, perhaps one far worse than this. For now, we’re going to have to just tough it out, man up, and accept that Assad, at least temporarily, is going to enjoy a victory we’ve given him through a series of unforced errors, all of our own making.
We think that by refusing to engage in military action, we’ve chosen not to create a mess. That’s a comforting fantasy. Sooner than we realize, we’ll wish we had taken our chances with all this on our own initiative, instead of having more dire decisions forced upon us later.
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Tom,
A genuinely thoughtful piece, unlike most of the commentary re Syria. You’re right, the window has closed, although the circus continues….
Very much appreciated, Steve. It was a hard one to write. Pretty rare I’ve ever thought we should admit defeat on anything.
Judging the comments, there seems to be an extremely high level of mistrust exhibited by some. I can’t say I can blame them. I am on the fence on this question. There is no clear explanation from anyone what happens next. While the bloodshed in Syria is clearly a travesty, what if we end up with the same situation as in Egypt? Then what? Another coup? How does that make the US look? Everyone else seems content letting this play out or at least not to interfere to visibly. Can’t we continue using more subtle means? A more humble Assad may be better than some of the alternatives. And if we attack, the first thing they will show on tv is some smashed up hospital or orphanage – they probably have one ready already…
I am genuinely sympathetic to your instincts on this, but I’m at a loss about how to produce a “more humble” Assad. His father was a butcher, and he’s no better. It’s not like this is new behavior.
So what? So was Stalin – we didn’t go to war with him in 1945. (Instead we contrived with his henchmen to kill America’s best general). What’s the difference now? Why is this butcher more apt for an intervention than others? And don’t tell me that you would also have been egging pathetic FDR on to war with the Soviets – I don’t think anyone here will buy that. (yes, spare me the “they had a large army” argument – everyone from Trieste to Stettin would have helped the Americans). Is this another tenure play? I don’t get it.
Interesting – I thought the “we killed Patton” theory had finally run its course. Good for you for keeping the classic nutty stuff still alive.
I wondered whether to include that parenthetical as it was likely to give you an excuse not to answer anything else – sadly I made the mistake of thinking that you would not take the easy way out
I actually have some pretty strong views on Stalin and the Cold War. You can purchase them here (used, cheap!) and read them at your leisure: Winning the World: Lessons for America’s Future from the Cold War. But I’ve had enough of conspiracy theorizing lately, thanks.
With men like Assad in power, the whole concept of deterrence somehow just doesn’t work.
The so called red line failed to be convincing and even if Syria were to be hit by US bombs, there is no guarantee neither Assad nor any other dictators having chemical weapons, won’t use them anymore.
Three reasons to this:first dictators are happy as long as their circle is happy and care little for the rest especially with limited strikes like it might be the case. Everthing has its limits but Assad could take a few hits before falling especially if the strikes only target counter-force values in small time frame. Then, Assad is “protected” by international law. Thanks to the UN and other bodies, powers are confronting each others, are talking about resolutions, verifications, one convention conflicting with another, are managing to bring doubt to the other claims, even are blackmailing each others. This is not to say the UN should be thrown away but more a case of the tideous aspect of international orgnisations regarding the use of law which overall, benefits the man or regime to punish since this latter can seat back, relax and enjoy the big powers arguing. A third reason making detterence to not use chemical weapons weak is alliances. As long as a big power is backing or somehow backing up a rogue state using chemical weapons, “humanitarian strikes” will be less likely to occur. Alliances bring a balance of power more even and we can have this case where a small power is able to perform atrocities because another, bigger ally is there watching over (but also maybe loosing its patience…). Russia has learn its lesson from Serbia in 1999. By the way,I can’t imagine (or don’t want to) if France or the US make the honest mistake to hit the Russian embassy in Syria (you know…like the Chinese embassy in Serbia in 1999).
We have created the ‘Assad Doctrine’: Despots can do anything they want – including gross violations of humanitarian norms and use of WMD -so long as they only target their own populations. Gah!
“we, collectively, have allowed our foreign policy to drown in a partisan swamp”
Maybe that is WHY it is time for us to focus on domestic issues and to leave the role of moral compass enforcement to the organization created exactly for that purpose.
I think you have the causal relationship backward. We’ve become so focused on ourselves and our own petty grievances in the richest, most powerful country in the world, that we have lost any ability to engage in any kind of moral reasoning at any level, especially in foreign affairs. There was once a time — not so long ago, during the Cold War — when Americans felt their country had a destiny. Now we gripe…about everything.
That was when we were engaged in a global struggle against a determined power capable of matching us world wide. That was national interest and many principles were laid on the altar of convenience in the process. That was why West Germany was relevant or Greece was relevant. How is Assad a threat to us again? Even Iran? What are we supposed to be fighting for here though? Human rights? No gassing policies? Would the author have preferred if Assad had rolled his tanks over these people?
Incidentally, what is our intelligence on this topic? Can the author cite the source of how we know what we allegedly know?
Senator Feinstein recently said that the public simply doesn’t know what she knows – that statement is no doubt (definitionally) accurate – whether it’s implied meaning is also accurate is another thing – shouldn’t she share before asking us to do or approve something? At least with Curveball there was an effort to produce a person – it seems that we’ve moved to a phase where we don’t have to be bothered with those kinds of vestiges of proof/details.
Incidentally, there are only two powers that are capable of threatening the US’ global dominance – and while we get distracted by this desert nonsense they continue to sharpen their teeth (including with the help of some of our less friendly friends).
“There was once a time — not so long ago, during the Cold War — when Americans felt their country had a destiny.”
What? No. The closest thing Americans ever had to a sense of destiny was that we were going to die in an Atom War with Soviet Russia. That we seem to be griping about everything now is because we always did but that level of paranoia has gone (and, even with all that it did to sustain technological development, good riddance to it.)
You’re sitting here and dolefully shaking your head about America’s lack of vision. So, “American vision” means blowing up the Syrian government so that a bunch of wild-eyed religious fundamentalists can take over?
Ugh. I knew it was a mistake to allow the posts from the Godwin violator up there. Rectified; apologies to all readers. Please keep comments germane and non-crazy, folks.
Who’s the anonymous ‘Nobody’ person with the tinfoil hat? Miley Cyrus?
American democracy (or republic) is based on the assumption that its elites represent the interests of the American nation as a whole and while there may be particular interests that get expressed at one time or another, overall we’re in this together. It is implicit in that contract that it is those elites that the US military is sworn to follow.
However, in the last 30 years our elites have become completely dissociated from the public as a whole as they live in their own world that is hardly defined by or limited to the United States. This world of think tanks, Davos, Open Societies, and triple citizenships, etc is removed from the every day experience of the commoners (this is, of course, a development not just of this country – see the latest Marcquardt/Cohn-Bendit statement on the “need” to abolish the nation state – so eagerly printed in the NY Times & other similar outfits around the “Western” world). It is also removed from most of the men and women of the military. If our elected leaders are elected from a preapproved slate and, upon joining the upper echelons are sworn to protect the money and interests that elected them and not the people that did, then they are more likely to drag the country into affairs that benefit very few people in this country. In most cases, that has little effect on the commoners but that stops (or should stop) with international wars and conflicts in which we collectively have zero interest and that breed hatred towards us broadly as a nation and not just for those who issue orders and those who take them.
No one wants to have the military running the country but, if the choice is presented, that does not mean that we would rather have the politicians run the country into the ground. An obsessive distate for soldiers speaking up on this issue is showing in this blog entry (no doubt due to the author’s background). Yet in this case it is troubling since Mr. Nichols did not seem overly concerned when over the last decade certain other military officers (also retired but usually in full uniform) acted in the media as pro war consultants, advisers and pundits (yes, I know the blog is not that old but that is the sense over its the duration). This suggests that Mr. Nichols doesn’t mind if the military brass join the executive in a pro war extravaganza – and, to be clear, I am not talking about simply following orders but rather actively and publicly agitating for policies favored by the administration (e.g., on tv, radio, in the Internet).
Everyone knows that, if instructed, the US military will follow orders. But as those orders are perceived as being increasingly deleterious to the United States we will see fewer and fewer people joining the military out of any patriotic obligation. The best advice one can give today’s youth is to stay as far away from the military as you can.
Of course, then you will end up with an essentially mercenary army that has as much in common with Main Street as today’s politicians. The benefit of such an army would be that it could probably be bought and paid for even more easily than the elites. Should the politicians ever wake up, the war interests may simply go directly to our new mercenaries to get what they want – Mr. Nichols might yet live to see how civil military relations will develop in that scenario.
Separately, it’s strange that the author now “changed his mind” (not really it seems, just that the time ain’t right right now). How short are these windows of opportunity? Will we have a right to debate the issue the next time a “window” opens? Or is the current brevity/failed opportunity supposed to convince us to act with more determination next time?
How would you know what I did or didn’t find troubling a decade ago?
No one who has read anything I’ve written would think that I don’t always find that kind of behavior troubling, especially when senior military officers play the political game through proxies in the national press. (I didn’t like it in the 1990s when Colin Powell did it regarding Bosnia, among other examples, and I believe Powell to be one of the worst offenders of American civil-military traditions.) I have repeatedly said that I am uncomfortable with serving officers like Gen. Hayden heading the CIA, or even with retired officers like Gen. Clapper at DNI, an office I don’t think should have been created in the first place. I have said repeatedly — on just this blog, which you apparently haven’t read — that I don’t like the military or military academies and schools being used as election-year props, by either party.
I’d say more than that, but your line about “think tanks, Davos,” etc., tells me more than I need to know. (What, no mention of the Trilateralists or the Bilderbergers?)
If you feel that strongly about the path the country has taken, then vote. But don’t be so shocked to find that millions of your fellow citizens may not share your view. I think military participation in politics (not policy, but politics) is corrosive to our democracy. But not as corrosive as the view taken by many people that if they don’t get their way in elections or in public policy, it cannot possibly be due to any honest disagreements or political defeats, but because of conspiracies on the part of some shadowy elite.
I’ve already made clear that I don’t think we should proceed if the country is this divided. What is it about you guys that you can’t even take “yes” for an answer?
“I’ve already made clear that I don’t think we should proceed if the country is this divided. What is it about you guys that you can’t even take “yes” for an answer?”
Maybe because your reasoning is entirely disingenuous.
You say we can’t proceed because the country doesn’t support another war, but you wrote your pro-invasion post on August 28. By that time, polls already made it clear that Americans were strongly against invasion:
http://news.yahoo.com/syria-war-escalates-americans-cool-u-intervention-reuters-003146054.html
Only 9 percent supported an attack! It rose to a whopping 25% if they believe Assad used CW on civilians. That’s not even a “divided” country; it’s a country united in opposition to the war you crave.
So were you ignorant of these polls, or is it that your concern for the will of the people is a more recent development?
If i may,
TG Chicago, It’s not about craving war–I share the same opinion as the author. What it is about is realizing the long term consequences, domestic and political, of inaction. What message does this inaction, division and reluctance send to our friends–or to our enemies, for that matter?
Division? What division? The American people are far more united on this issue than most.
In regards to the consequences of inaction, let’s go back to the last march for war. The Bush administration identified an Axis of Evil: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. As far as major military operations go, we chose “action” for Iraq and “inaction” for Iran and North Korea.
Explain to me how our inaction was so much more terrible than our action.
@TG
Division? how about the political infighting in Congress, for starters. Aside from that, I think you know what I mean when I talk about the consequences of inaction and reluctance. Doing nothing, as Mr. Nichols has explained before, is a choice in and of itself; a choice to sit by and let the killing continue. You know as well as I do, TG, that regardless of intervention, people will continue to die, either due to actions on the part of the various insurgent groups in Syria or due to violence perpetrated by Assad’s government and the Syrian army; people die, it’s what happens in war, believe it or not.
Furthermore, regardless of whether or not we intervene, there will be consequences in the long term on the international stage; if the rebels win, the result could well be a stash of chemical weapons in the hands of those with the will to use them on us, in addition to the domestic consequences for non-Sunni Syrians. If Assad wins…well, there be more bloodletting anyway, since i have no doubt that there will be a witch-hunt par-excellence for those who still oppose the regime.
Still, there’ll be consequences for the U.S as a result of the bad-blood over Iraq; the Obama Administration having to turn back on the statements it made has, as a few newspapers have noted, turned the U.S into something of a fool on the world stage, and weakened the credibility of the nation’s foreign commitments as a whole; what will this mean for, to give an example, the Philippines–whose security is guaranteed in part by the U.S, and is currently locked in what some would call a “stealth war” with the PRC–as are all of the nations whom the latter’s “blue maritime soil” and “nine dashed line” claims affect?
I’m not concerned about Syria; neither side there is worth fighting for. What i AM concerned about is the weakness that inaction through political infighting portrays on the world-stage, and the message it sends to those who would take advantage of that “weakness” to further their own ends.
Okay, you make a fair point that there is disagreement in Congress. But despite what Tom says, it’s not on partisan lines — it’s between representatives who are listening to the clear voice of their constituents and those who are listening to the military-industrial complex.
“if the rebels win, the result could well be a stash of chemical weapons in the hands of those with the will to use them on us, in addition to the domestic consequences for non-Sunni Syrians.”
True. But I don’t see how a missile attack on Assad’s military makes this scenario less likely. It seems that it would make it *more* likely. One of Tom’s explicit goals for an attack is to weaken Assad, which would obviously strengthen the rebels. Tom never explains why it’s in our interest to strengthen the rebels, who may be worse even than Assad.
“What i AM concerned about is the weakness that inaction through political infighting portrays on the world-stage, and the message it sends to those who would take advantage of that “weakness” to further their own ends.”
I’m not terribly worried about this. Every geopolitical situation is different and has its own calculus. Regardless of “signaling”, the fact is that there are some areas of the world where we can flex our muscle and some where we are constrained.
We are a superpower, but not an omnipower. We do, in fact, have weaknesses — not merely perceived, but actual. That was made vividly clear in Iraq. The world knows.
The only way we could militarily force Assad to do what we want is to engage in a full-blown boots-on-the-ground invasion. And we’re not going to do that; it’s not worth the cost. Everybody knows that.
It’s also well-known that relatively limited attacks (missiles, etc) will bring about quite limited results. Assad would likely weather the attacks and come out of it looking stronger to his supporters. I don’t view that as a good outcome.
At any rate, do you care to respond to the question I posed in the previous comment? When you compare the results of the past ~10 years, our inaction in Iran and North Korea looks far preferable to our action in Iraq. Agree or disagree?
@TG,
as to the question you proposed:
-i agree that the U.S is a super power, not an omnipower; it does indeed have its weaknesses. With that in mind, I agree with you that inaction on Iran and North Korea actually is preferable, because those nations–for all their rhetoric–haven’t really done anything; all of the intelligence agencies testified that Iran dropped its nuclear weaponry program sometime in 2003, which means that U.S action with regards to Iran is largely the continuation that of a grudge match that began in 1953 with the CIA operation there, and has sat at a simmer since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Indeed, one of the reasons for American fretting with regards to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the idea that if Afghanistan fell, it would open up a pathway to Iran, and Soviet control of a major oil supply. Put simply: the U.S really doesn’t like hostile management of critical resources.
As for North Korea: North Korea, for all its bluster, is incapable of doing anything. Was the frenzy over it earlier this year an exaggeration? Most certainly. However, when the Korean War was last fought, it could easily have precipitated WWIII: Kim Il-Sung actually did request open military intervention from Stalin (though the best he got was a fleet of Russian MiGs, which the U.S knew about, but decided not to act upon AFAIK).
The risk with North Korea, and thus the reluctance to do anything concrete there comes from, as far as i know, A) the fact that North Korea’s army is obsolete, and that B) it’s backed up by the PRC. There is every indication that, despite public PRC reluctance this year, the PRC still views North Korea as a valuable buffer area between it and western influence, and would defend the Kim regime if necessary. There’s also the issue that the PRC has begun to manipulate the history of that area, claiming that an ancient Korean kingdom, Koguryo–whose borders stretched from somewhere south of Seoul and well into what is now Manchuria–was actually ethnically Chinese, when nothing could be further from the truth. Shelia Miyoshi Jager’s article on this is well worth the read: http://japanfocus.org/-Sheila_Miyoshi-Jager/3477, specifically this quote:
“During his meeting with the Chinese Premier, the South Korean president raised questions about recent reports made by Chinese archeologists and historians who claimed that since Kogury?’s former territory now resides within the current borders of the Peoples Republic of China, its history should be considered part of “Chinese history.”13 The official press release of the meeting revealed that “President Roh had expressed his dissatisfaction with some conclusion of the Chinese archeological teams and the publication of a provincial research center dealing with events some two thousand years ago.”14
President Roh’s concern over China’s historical treatment of Kogury? began in 2002 following China’s launching of its ambitious Northeast Project. The ostensible aim of the Project was to “strengthen the association between China proper and the northeast region” that includes the three provinces in this region: Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning.15 But as the South Korean public soon learned, the Chinese government and scholars associated with the Project appeared to be “conducting a systematic and comprehensive effort to distort the ancient history of Northeast Asia” by portraying Kogury? and the succeeding state of Parhae (Korean)/Bohai (Chinese) as Chinese, not Korean, kingdoms. In April 2004, South Korea formally protested the Chinese Foreign Ministry removal from its website of references to Kogury? as being part of Korea’s Three Kingdom era and its portrayal as Chinese.16 Beyond this bickering over history, however, the political ramifications of the dispute have been far-reaching. By claiming Kogury? as part of China’s ancient past, South Koreans asserted the Chinese government was undermining the legitimacy and political authority of North Korea whose territory was once part of Kogury?.
China’s treatment of Kogury? has not been all that different from its treatment of other peoples and states that are now part of the People’s Republic of China.17 Knowing that the threat to the integrity of the Chinese nation has historically always come from internal challenges to its central authority, China has long sought to exercise control over its diverse ethnic population by promoting a common Chinese identity under the rubric of a “multi-ethnic nation” and conducting assimilationist policies.”
also, this:
“the Northeast Project clearly has more far-reaching implications: to create a singular national history and identity in the Northeast that could pave the way for the economic intervention and integration of North Korea. Indeed, it is not coincidental that China’s concern with Kogury?’s history began in earnest in 2004 when Premier Wen announced that the Chinese government would embark on an ambitious economic development program for North Korea. According to Chinese government sources, “Chinese investment in North Korea in 2006 topped $135 million” and bilateral trade reached “$1.69 billion, an increase of almost seven percent over the $1.58 billion in bilateral trade during 2005.”21 Another study indicated that “in 2008 China accounted for 73 percent of North Korea’s record high foreign trade of $3.8 billion.” Trade imbalance and North Korea’s economic dependence also reached lopsided proportions with imports from China of “crude oil, petroleum and synthetic textiles” amounting to some $2 billion, while exports to China consisting mainly of coal and iron ore totaled just $750 million. China today provides “90 percent of North Korea’s oil, 80 percent of consumer goods, and 45 percent of its food.”22”
So, apologies for the long battery of quotes, but in my view, North Korea is not worth bothering with unless they invade the south, which has an infinitely small chance of happening. Additionally, North Korea is being integrated into China, so any act of aggression against North Korea risks a wider Sino-American land war, one that has considerably less chance of victory than the successful defense of South Korea during the 1950-53 war.
Okay, so you agree that inaction worked reasonably well in Iran and North Korea.
Would you also agree that action worked pretty badly in Iraq? Including the fact that our experience in Iraq has surely led to a great deal of the reluctance we’re seeing vis a vis Syria?
My view about “weakness” is similar to the old saying “Better to shut your mouth and be thought a fool than to open it and remove all doubt”. If other world powers think we’re weak because we’re not acting in Syria, I’m not sure that the solution is to act weakly in Syria. And I’ve seen no proposals for action that seem more likely to truly project strength rather than weakness. Merely lobbing missiles doesn’t project strength. If Assad survives the volley, which most believe he would, it would project weakness.
@TG,
Iraq, from what I’ve read, was a blatant lie, a war that was launched using the ire generated by 9/11 to accomplish two goals. First–so I’ve heard–was the establishment of another base in the middle east to replace Saudi Arabia (thus ending Usama bin Laden’s complaint about “infidels in the holy land”), as well as a check against Iran, which was the second goal, AFAIK.
Bonus points for “cleaning up daddy’s mess” and oil collection, where contractors were paid in excess of 100k each to haul the stuff (although I’m pretty sure China is the biggest purchaser of Iraqi oil).
Otherwise, Iraq was grossly mismanaged from the very get go, and what defeated the U.S there was not military defeat but a public that has been increasingly unwilling to suffer casualties (bonus points again that the “if it bleeds it leads” media made a show of counting off the thousands of deaths). Of course, this isn’t to fault the public, but really Iraq became another Vietnam as far as public opinion is concerned.
“Merely lobbing missiles doesn’t project strength. If Assad survives the volley, which most believe he would, it would project weakness.”
How so? I’m not exactly a student of the War College, so you’ll have to run that one by me.
Fortunately, we live in a republic, not a direct democracy. There are times to do things that are unpopular. The public, I think, is hesitant, because they sense their national leaders are hesitant. You cannot do foreign policy by polls, unless you restrict questions like “What should we do about Syria” to people who actually know where Syria is.
Can you not see how you’re moving around the goalposts?
You: We can’t do this if the country doesn’t support it.
Me: But the country didn’t support it when you wrote your first post advocating it.
You: Sometimes you have to do unpopular things because Americans are stupid.
That’s not a response to the point I made.
Of course not. Romney was the fool so arrogant that he didn’t even have a concession speech on the night he lost; Romney was, if anything, more of a hawk than Obama has become in the view of some; reference his statements on starting what would have amounted to a trade war with China. Aside from that, i have no confidence in a man who is of the same ilk as the men who gave themselves multi-million-dollar parachutes in 2008 as the economy the ran into the ground burned around them.
I’m not entirely clear on why the window has passed. Are the chemical weapons and their dispersal mechanisms completely concealed now?
I too am disappointed that the President did not act with “dispatch.” I mentioned to a few of my friends that this episode brought home to me that the key to executive power is time – the executive is meant to act quickly, for if time lapses, it doesn’t matter what quantity of force you can deliver to a target (to take one example).
Still, isn’t it credible to assume in this case that the President does have the information he needs to order strikes that are more than “shock and awe?” I suspect the President does know where to strike exactly – am I wrong to think this?
“We’ve spoken loud and clear, and we’ve said in a steady voice: “We no longer have any idea what the hell we’re doing or what we stand for.””
Ah-hem. We’ve said in a steady voice that we have no interest in further foreign adventures, or in aiding the cause of one side of a civil war in which neither side is on our side. We’ve said in a steady voice that we are the friends of liberty everywhere, but the guardians only of our own.
Yes, yes, thank you, Mr. Adams. The average American has no such sophistication, sadly, and would not understand the provenance or meaning of that quote. This isn’t about bringing liberty to the benighted peoples of Syria, it’s about preventing a “new normal” in which chemical weapons are used with impunity by anyone, anywhere — because sooner or later, those weapons will be turned on us.
The reason none of this looks like it’s in our interest is because short-sighted people have defined interest as “the stuff that happens between now and next week,” and not in terms of “creating a safer and more stable international environment in which America and its allies can pursue the things their citizens want and need.” It’s all short term hysterics, in which people who have no idea what an Alawite is can get their say and enjoy a moment of self-importance while firmly committing to being against whatever it is that thing is over there with those people.
As I’ve said, they have the right to be wrong. But when they have to ante up and pay an even greater price for their amoral embrace of an isolationism that America has never really been able to manage, they’re going to be pretty mad about it.
Such awful bogus reasoning.
First of all, you’re blaming “partisanship”? Nonsense! Polls clearly show that bombing Syria is highly unpopular among ALL Americans. Your talk of “the moonbat left and the wingnut right” betrays your ignorance of the basic facts.
Even if you meant purely Washington partisanship, recall the Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote. There were Rs and Ds on either side. Looking at the whip counts in both houses you see far more intermingling of Rs and Ds than in any other issue in recent memory.
Another point: last week, you pretended that somehow we could lob a few missiles into Syria and stop them (and everybody else in the world) from ever using chemical weapons again. Now because we took an extra week, suddenly that wouldn’t work anymore? Utter hogwash.
Additionally, you said “the American public has decided that the use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians is something they can live with.”
The American public realizes that we can only prevent the use of chemical weapons in Syria if we commit to a full-fledged invasion. Lobbing some missiles isn’t going to cut it; it will just be the first step into the quagmire. So the American public (not just the fringe right and left) has said they’re not willing to invade, and they don’t support meaningless half-measures either.
From what you’ve said (particularly your previous post’s ominous mention of the goals for the “first phase of this conflict”, eagerly looking forward to further phases), I strongly suspect what you’ve always wanted was a full invasion. I’m not sure why you’re unwilling to say so, but perhaps it’s because you know the vast majority of the American people do not agree with that position.
If you didn’t want full invasion, then you wanted meaningless destruction which would have zero chance of meeting the goals you set out. I am glad the American public disagrees.
Actually, I mostly assign partisanship to the higher political echelons of the country. I blame the position of ordinary Americans on the toxic combination of sanctimony, self-centeredness, and pure ignorance that seems to rule all political debates these days. (You know: the people who were shocked, shocked to find out that the NSA spies on people, a plain fact that anyone who reads a newspaper already knew.)
Americans, at least these days, only have two modes of engagement with political issues: “Off” and “hysterical.” There has to be something in between.
“Actually, I mostly assign partisanship to the higher political echelons of the country.”
Higher than the House and Senate? Where, far more than any issue in years, there is no clear partisan split?
You assume that anyone who disagrees with you must suffer from ignorance. If was so, it would be understandable; no advocates for intervention are explaining how a limited strike will achieve anything useful.
But then, as your silence makes clear, you never wanted a limited strike. You wanted the strikes to be the “first phase”, then once we had one foot in the quagmire, you planned to advocate for more and more war.
You’ve finally outed me. I want long, drawn-out wars. Preferably, many at a time.
I’ve explained why I think a limited strike will be useful. I’ve explained why I think this question is riven by partisanship. I’ve explained that I don’t like the Executive branch ‘s hands tied by Congress if there has to be a second or third strike on Syrian military targets.
I think I’ve been reasonably patient here, so let me save us both the energy at this point. You’re not interested in explanations. Like I said: I get it. You’re angry. You don’t think we should do anything about the use of chemical weapons on civilians. Noted.
“I’ve explained why I think a limited strike will be useful.”
You really have not. Your explanation is:
1) Bombs away!
2) ?????
3) No more use of chemical weapons.
You’ve never tried to connect the dots. You just asserted that these things would happen. I just re-read your first post to be sure, and you never explain step 2.
(BTW, in your previous post, you said that it was inevitable for the US to respond militarily. I understand that you no longer support US intervention, but do you still think it’s inevitable?)
“I’ve explained why I think this question is riven by partisanship.”
You really have not.
I’ve pointed to polls of the American public.
I’ve pointed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote.
I’ve pointed to whip counts on the full House and Senate.
All of these show far less partisan bent than the vast majority of national issues in the past several years.
The closest you came to an explanation was this:
“Republicans who cheered on a full-up invasion of Iraq now thoughtfully pull on their chins and call for cooler heads to prevail while they pretend to reflect on strategic theory. Democrats, for their part, have rediscovered the joys of intervention.”
The first error here is the implication that Rs and Ds are voting as unified blocs. They clearly are not.
The second error is to assume that if one has a different opinion on Syria than they did on Iraq, the only explanation is partisanship. It’s amusing to see this logic coming from the same guy who decried “anti-interventionists dredging up disingenuous analogies about Iraq to buttress straw-man arguments…”. I guess now that you’re an anti-interventionist, you feel like you must create poor arguments and disingenuous analogies?
Why does it not even occur to you that perhaps people might be leery of intervening in Syria because Iraq went so poorly?
“You don’t think we should do anything about the use of chemical weapons on civilians.”
I don’t think we should do anything symbolic and meaningless in response to CW use on civilians. And nobody (including you) has convinced me that a limited strike would be anything more than symbolic and meaningless in and of itself. Few have even made a serious attempt to do so.
I also fear that when a limited strike had highly limited results, that would get the usual suspects pushing for additional “phases of conflict”.
@TG,
Really now. The author stated what was his analysis of the situation based upon the evidence he had. And he does, i might remind you, have more qualifications than either you or I, what with his Ph.D and his experience in this area. He has indeed been very patient, while you–not satisfied with just stating your opinion–have proceeded to attempt to crush every single dissenting opinion on this blog that might have a shred of evidence against your own opinion. That’s not reasoned debate; if nothing else, it’s extremely infantile and–from my perspective–speaks of someone who HAS to be right, all the time, lest his self-worth be lessened. In the gaming world, It’s sometimes referred to as one’s “e-d**k,” and is very nearly universally the province of young adolescents. It’s also known as the “Dunning-Kruger effect.”
I will concede the point that you certainly have popular backing (though all statistics can be manipulated to certain ends), but I will still argue the point that we cannot trade short-sighted public opinion for potentially long term and epoch-defining consequences.
We know the costs of war, and are very familiar with them; Russia has already said that it would not intervene, and China does not have the capability to do so. Iran is a known quantity, despite all its bluster, and is most assuredly NOT making a nuclear weapon.
on the other hand, the policy fallout of inaction, if predictable, is an unknown, I would argue; feel free to correct me if you think I’m wrong, but I can name at least three countries that would take advantage of a perceived U.S weakness to further their own ends on the international stage.
“The author stated what was his analysis of the situation based upon the evidence he had.”
As I’ve stated — without having received a response — he seems to have ignored easily available evidence. He says that we can’t attack if the country isn’t behind it, but the country wasn’t behind it when he said attack was both wise and inevitable.
“(though all statistics can be manipulated to certain ends)”
Unless you have a case to make about how these particular statistics (repeated over many polls) were manipulated, this is a non sequitur.
As I stated in another comment, I believe the problem isn’t so much that other countries might perceive US weakness; it’s that some in the US don’t seem to understand that we truly have some weaknesses. (or, perhaps more accurately, there are some things over which we have less than complete control)
I get the impression that interventionists believe all problems can be solved with just the right amount of bombs. That is not so. Unless interventionists can connect the dots between bombing and success, they will not convince the American people of their wisdom. Tom has not expended any effort in that direction.
I have asked several questions which have gone unanswered. Among them:
1) How do missile attacks lead to accomplishment of Tom’s stated goals?
2) How can you blame “partisanship” for your woes when this issue — unlike most others these days — does not fall neatly into a red-vs-blue template?
3) Why is it that lack of popular support caused Tom to change his view when the lack of support existed all along?
Perhaps we’d have a more constructive debate if you or Tom took these issues head-on rather than talking around them.
By the way, if you think that slinging an epithet like “extremely infantile” is a useful rhetorical tactic, then I suppose we have different definitions of “reasoned debate”. How about you set aside the name-calling and directly address the issues I’ve enumerated above?
@TG
the problem was that until you calmed down today, your questioning of him did indeed seem shrill. I called your rhetoric juvenile; this does not necessarily mean that you yourself are. Try looking up G.I.F.T to see what i mean. You treated the author as if he had all the answers, he clearly doesn’t and he has the right to state his own opinion.
anyway
1) I am well aware that the U.S does indeed have weaknesses, particularly the tendency, with its large military, to view every problem as a nail.
2) the whole Syria intervention debate has been an absolute fracas; I can’t speak for the author, since I’m not him, but it really has become a mess due to political mismanagement.
I understand that the public (what was it, as much as 90% according to one poll?) is against intervention, but I think the point that Tom Nichols was trying to make was that the public–like the military–is often fighting the last war, and that there is a fair amount of genuine lack of information (and disinformation) out there in the media. As i’ve heard several people comment over the years: “it’s a sad state of affairs when you have to go to foreign news sources to find out what’s going on in your country, much less the world.”
Tom was also speaking of short-term political blindness, long term consequences for appeasement of the public.
You’ve said that you’re not worried about the long term consequences. I can’t claim to be a clairvoyant, but even I, as a history undergraduate, know that what actions we take–or don’t–will have long term effects. We can’t predict with total accuracy what those are, though the general shape can be seen; the consequences of the farce that was Iraq are most certainly being felt today. So my concern, as i mentioned in earlier posts, is not about the U.S directly; the U.S is not–nor in the near future–going to come under direct attack by a foreign opponent; that’s not the consequence of all this. You commented that
“Every geopolitical situation is different and has its own calculus. Regardless of “signaling”, the fact is that there are some areas of the world where we can flex our muscle and some where we are constrained.”
I’ll be blunt: my direct concern is that the PRC specifically will view this, with time, as further weakening of the U.S and its commitment to its allies in the Pacific; the PRC already ramped up is harassment operations and claims in the South and East China seas in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis. How then, will they view U.S reluctance (and inability) to act over the issue under debate in Syria. I’m not a clairvoyant, I can’t predict the future. However, I can predict, judging by the trend over the last decade or so, that the PRC will become more aggressive, more assertive, and that this in turn provokes a greater risk of a conflict between major nations. Call me whatever you like, but judging by the trends, I have no confidence that a revanchist PRC (for that is, in essence, what the PRC is) would be a better regional hegemon than the U.S.
“the problem was that until you calmed down today, your questioning of him did indeed seem shrill.”
I forgot. As President Merkin Muffley said, “Gentlemen, you can’t fight in here! This is the War Room.”
If one says “Hey, here’s an idea: Let’s blow stuff up! That should make things better in some nonspecific way.”, it’s reasonable to expect they might face shrill opposition. If they can’t handle that without shrinking away, then they shouldn’t agitate for war.
Also, re-read this post and the one before it. Tom writes with a great deal of condescension. He can belittle those with whom he disagrees, but it’s a one-way street? I guess he can dish it out but not take it.
Me, I don’t mind dealing with his condescension if he would actually address the flaws I’ve pointed out in his ideas.
“You’ve said that you’re not worried about the long term consequences.”
I don’t believe I said that. Can you provide a quote?
“my direct concern is that the PRC specifically will view this, with time, as further weakening of the U.S and its commitment to its allies in the Pacific”
All the more reason to ignore situations in the Middle East that we can’t control and focus on the Pacific region.
I just don’t see how the PRC is going to be emboldened by inaction, but be afraid to act if we shoot a few missiles that don’t even take out Assad.
Again: I laid out three specific objections to Tom’s posts. Again: I got no response to those objections.
@Tom
Agreed, good sir.
That the NSA was spying on the public–filtering through emails and whatnot–should have been obvious from the very get go; It’s their bloody job. I seem to remember, besides, coming across an article that claimed that the vast majority of cases were directed against foreigners within the U.S, not U.S citizens. That article has, however, been lost amongst the hysteria.
The NSA program is best compared to a police investigation that takes place before a crime has been committed, relying upon tip offs and gathered data. In fact, that’s exactly what it appears to be.
Of course, that’s lost upon people who seem to be obsessed with the idea that the NSA might be interested in their personal conversations, the sort of people who seem to be best placed in the same category of people who protest in front of the State Capitol Building every time someone makes a ghost of a move at regulating firearms crimes in the U.S; i.e, they’re the category of people who would happily replace what they consider to be a “tyranny of the federal government” with a tyranny of their very own making.
More to the point though, and with regards to engagement of political issues, I would suspect that this hysteria on all issues domestic and foreign is the result of A) a polarizing media that fills its pages with the “if it bleeds, it leads” stores, but more importantly B) an education system and exceptionalist culture that have resulted in an increasingly ill-educated and misinformed public that is unwilling to face the idea that–save for military spending and the number of incarcerations–the U.S has never really been number one in anything.
I’ve been trying to figure out how we’ve returned to this kind of aggressive ignorance, and I think there’s something to your point about the education system. I don’t think there’s been a time in U.S. history when people know less, but correspondingly think they know more than ever.
It’s as if knowledge and self-esteem now run in a directly inverse relationship.
@Tom
“It’s as if knowledge and self-esteem now run in a directly inverse relationship.”
Interesting thought, that. I think it’s more for the same reason why people read “People magazine”; anything to distract from the fact that they’re–ultimately–just another cog in the machine, and that their place in life has not lived up to the expectations created by the society we live in. I think that’s part of the rage over Syria and the NSA; it’s all right for our opponents to do it (we’re taught to expect that), but our doing the same in the name of our own national interests represents a betrayal of everything we’re taught as children, and even up until we enter college. Honestly, how do they think nations really work? I’m a history undergraduate, but even I understand that the U.S is really just the latest and greatest in looking out for its own interests, as has every great power before it, and it’s the reason why not intervening in Syria has me disappointed; all the powers who could benefit from this and are vying for their own hegemony–that is, Russia and the PRC–are demonstrably just as bad as, or in the case of the PRC, worse than the U.S. Come 30 years from now, when I turn 55, I’d rather be complaining about U.S actions overseas, something i have an infinitely small sway over as part of the U.S public, than complaining about a resurrected Chinese Empire (for that appears to be the end-goal of the PRC) harassing or invading our allies without our being able to do anything about it. That is, something that, given the trends of hypernationalism in proportion to domestic problems there, is a real possibility (see: http://sinostand.com/2013/08/01/the-hard-long-slog/)
Hey Dr. Nichols,
I’ve really enjoyed reading your blog over the past few days (I actually found it on Reddit, as one of your articles had been linked on a subreddit concerning international security). I think that you lay out an excellent case for saying goodbye to the prospect of intervention in Syria, and I agree with you that the President’s decision to outsource this decision to Congress opened him up to the short-sighted micromanaging that’s endemic within congressional decisions on military action. My question is, what if the momentum does swing the other way? Surely it’s not impossible that Kerry’s intensive efforts to round up support do yield some fruit, and perhaps Obama’s address to the nation this Tuesday does shore up more support among lawmakers. I agree with you that right now the domestic climate is poisoning any chance for success, but would you perhaps re-assess your opinion midweek once Congress is back, Obama has made his address and Kerry has recruited more support?
Thanks,
Ben Rimland
Hi, Ben – Nice to hear from you! I think it’s fully possible that Congress could be swung; I suspect the act will pass the Senate and fail in the House, but anything could happen, I suppose. My concern at this point is (a) we’ve talked it to death in front of the enemy, to the point where it really does look like saving face, and (b) that the President will be so limited by whatever passes the House that we’ll be in another political crisis in short order no matter what happens. I think at this point, if I could pick my best outcome, it would be for Congress to approve that from now on, the President has the option to act against Syria on particular grounds, including WMD use. That way, POTUS isn’t boxed in by a time limit, Assad goes back to not knowing what could happen next, and Congress is out of the micro-managing of military operations. I doubt we can get there from here, however. I’d still bet that the House either refuses to pass it, or passes it by so narrow a margin that it is almost as bad as not passing it at all.
Dr. Nichols:
Although your original post staked out a position that was more positive than is my own regarding the potential net-benefit of intervention (I truly think that ship sailed around late-2011, when the Hariri-sympathetic elements of the FSA began to see their leadership of the organized Syrian resistance seriously contested by groups like Ahrar As-Sham, etc.), I deeply appreciated the level-headedness that you brought to the conversation. I feel the same way about this post, as well. There is much in this analysis (sadly) to recommend it. We’ve painted ourselves into too many corners, hashed out far too much of this far too publicly, and allowed our basest political impulses to drive “debate”; this seems to have become the order of the day/week/month/year, etc.
My long-term cynicism regarding our nation’s ability to stake out a coherent foreign policy position is only matched by my certainty that we’ve (at least for now) lost the will to do so. As is my wont, of course, I link these tendencies and failings to the coming (and accelerating) challenge posed by China (and Russia, to a slightly lesser extent in some – though not all – ways), and I find myself more than a little disheartened. National security work at this point in our republic’s stage of life feels a bit like that performed by a watchman on a wall, shouting out warnings of gathering threats at the horizon, while the city within the walls below commits itself to its own rot from within. Overly dramatic to be sure, but that’s honestly how I feel as often as not.
Thanks, as per the usual, for your insight.
Glad you found it useful, and thanks for reading. Sadly, we agree about much.
@jake
“As is my wont, of course, I link these tendencies and failings to the coming (and accelerating) challenge posed by China (and Russia, to a slightly lesser extent in some – though not all – ways), and I find myself more than a little disheartened. National security work at this point in our republic’s stage of life feels a bit like that performed by a watchman on a wall, shouting out warnings of gathering threats at the horizon, while the city within the walls below commits itself to its own rot from within. Overly dramatic to be sure, but that’s honestly how I feel as often as not.”
Exactly how i feel as well. That rot being especially pervasive, I feel, in the quality of weaponry turned out by defense contractors (witness the failure of the F-35); my ultimate fear is that the U.S is very much as it was well into World War II; wholly unprepared and underestimating, equipment wise, the caliber of the opponent they may have to face, and led by men who will discover these flaws only too late.
“That rot being especially pervasive, I feel, in the quality of weaponry turned out by defense contractors (witness the failure of the F-35)”
What’s your opinion of the F-14?
I ask because the second test flight of the F-14 ended with total destruction of the aircraft due to complete engine failure followed by a crash.
And it wasn’t until several marks later that it actually got the engines it was supposed to have.
The reason the F-35 looks like it’s taking too long and costing so much is that we *aren’t* rushing a half-assed design into service and then waiting for a few dead pilots to show us what needs fixing.
Dr. Nichols,
Your pro-intervention argument is seriously flawed. I am not even going to get into the complete disregard you seem to hold for Clausewitz in your argument. Instead I will address another issue. In this case, it does not seem that you understand the Ends-Ways-Means framework of warfighting. First, one requires a desired end, or objective. It is very difficult to achieve anything if one doesn’t know what one is trying to accomplish. And your arguments for intervening are extremely vague when it comes to the objective for which you suggest we fight. As you wrote, “The object should not be to win the peace, create a Syrian democracy, kill Assad, or save the Unicorns. In the immediate circumstance, limited strikes can degrade Syrian operations, buy some breathing room for the rebels, deter (or suppress) the use of chemical weapons, and generally make life a lot harder for Assad so that others can control parts of Syria and he can’t.”
Unfortunately, “creating breathing room” is not a viable objective, because it is not an objective at all. You conflating ends and means. The only “end” you put forward is the deterrence of chemical weapon usage by the pro-Assad forces. Well, what happens when he is not deterred by a few Tomahawk strikes? To what extent are you suggesting we carry out this attack? How shall we determine whether or not our war making is effective? Is our only yardstick to be the future use of chemical weapons by Assad’s forces? Remember Liddell Hart’s quote that the object of war is a better peace. If you are suggesting that we proceed with war against pro-Assad forces without a better peace in mind, then you suggest to use the military with no object. And you wonder why some would object?
Secondly, you have yet to even consider how “limited military strikes” would achieve your extremely vague goals. This is the “Ways-Means” portion of the framework. One has to be able to realistically show how one’s actions will actually contribute to achieving the stated goal. Although, in this case, because your goals are so vaguely stated, you could just claim that any actions we take are actually furthering them. Politicians and poor military leaders do this all the time.
The issue is not whether the use of chemical weapons is horrendous. (It is.) The issue is that the President and his administration have yet to articulate a clear goal besides “Using CWs is bad! We must punish Assad!” They have also failed to explain how making war on Assad will achieve a clear goal. It doesn’t matter what the circumstances are, if the military is to be the means of a political end, then that end must be clearly elaborated, and the specifics of the means must be tied to that end. If not, then we should not undertake the war, or “limited military action.”
Thank you for the lesson in Clausewitz and the making of strategy. That would have been very, very helpful to me earlier in my career. Alas, too late old and too late smart.
On a more substantive level, I will say that I see Clausewitz and Liddell-Hart represent thinking about “war” as it was understood in its 19th and 20th century incarnations. (Despite the misuse of Clausewitz in endless books and more than a few classrooms, On War is not the secret answer to everything. My dear friend, the late Michael Handel, is turning in his grave as I write that, but he and I never agreed about this, either.)
Rather, I tend to agree more with General Rupert Smith’s observation that war, as it has cognitively been known until this point, no longer exists; or, at the least, that it is now the rarest form of state violence. We need to think more creatively about what constitutes “strategy” in world where state-on-state conflict among peers or near-peers is only one, and not even remotely the most common, type of military engagement.
In fact, you sound as if you’ve been firmly grounded by my (or someone’s) war college in a “framework” that is not actually a framework. If that’s true, I am concerned if that is all you’ve taken away from your exposure to the common-sense notion that strategy is a relationship among ways, means, and ends, especially if you do not appreciate the political reality that “ends” are anything that civil leaders decide they are. Saying that you don’t happen to like them is not the same thing as saying that they fail some objective test of what constitutes an “end.” I think that degrading Assad’s forces so he cannot regain lost ground through chemical use is a “end,” even if the goal is not to invade and remake the entire Middle East. I understand that you disagree with that end. That is not the same thing as “not having an objective.” I have one; it’s simply not the same as yours (whatever yours is, since it’s not clear from your message).
Dr. Nichols,
Had I known that you are a NWC professor when I wrote my comment, I would have used different languange, as you are correct, Ends-Ways-Means is not a proper framework. That being said, my understanding is that any “end” suggested by any leader, be he or she civilian or military, needs to be subjected to the reasonable, feasible, achievable test. In this instance, “degrading Assad’s forces” struggles to meet the “achievable” criteria. How can we know if we have accomplished the task? To what depth and breadth are we willing to carry fight? Are U.S. casualties considered in your calculus? (Not that that needs to be a decisive factor, but it should be considered.) To enter into conflict with poorly defined goals and no way of knowing whether those goals have been met is bad policy.
As to my objective, it is to husband U.S. forces until they are needed. I do not consider the Syrian civil war to be a case of need. I fail to find your slippery slope argument (in which chemical weapons are used with impunity by anyone, anywhere — because sooner or later, those weapons will be turned on us) sufficient. I do not see how intervening in that country’s civil war is in the interests of the U.S. The only net gain I see from attacking Assad is the degradation of Iran’s asymmetric and hybrid capabilities, and that interest is not overriding enough to warrant attacking Syria right now.
There is no “test” for such goals. War and the use of force do not proceed along such orderly checklists. And again, your “poorly defined goals” are my “very clearly defined goals.”
But the point is moot. As of today, the Russians are running this show. Which is what happens when we dither around the way we have for the past three weeks.
One thing I do agree with: The time to retaliate was the minute we were aware of a chemical-weapons attack.
Hi, what do you think about next move if this 6 points signed today will fail? What if Assad will not give the list within one week?
John Schindler and I are going to put a piece in The National Interest on that next week.